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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies international knowledge flows looking at (1) patent citations that track codified 
knowledge and (2) technological collaborations between inventors that gauge knowledge transmitted 
through face to face contacts. It uses a gravity model for 13 countries (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, 
China, South Africa and Mexico and USA, UK, Japan, Italy, Germany, France and Canada) using EPO 
data. In the case of tacit knowledge flows it shows that IPRs reinforcement has no effect and that sharing a 
common legal origin and technological proximity are more important than geographical distance. In the 
case of codified knowledge flows IPRs reinforcement has a positive effect only when applicants’ citations 
are considered.  
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1. Introduction 
 
International research collaborations and joint international patenting have been rising globally. 
These trends multiply the opportunities for international knowledge flows through augmented possibilities 
of interaction between individuals and organizations. How those opportunities are translated into practice, 
and who is capturing the benefits depend, at the country level, on different factors, such as the 
accumulated capacities of the different agents, the prevailing specialization pattern, and also on the 
institutional management of innovation policy and intellectual property. As innovation goes global, there is 
a rising demand for global knowledge governance. Intellectual property (IP) protection is, probably, the 
domain in which policies have pioneered the extension of homogeneous standards across countries.  
Different legal legislations, differences in patent exceptions, patent subject matters and enforcement 
conditions, just to name a few, are considered to drive firms decisions on the location of R&D facilities in 
given countries, to influence the willingness to undertake collaborative research projects and to search for 
joint patent protection. However, the prevailing legal framework is only one of the reasons that affect the 
decisions to collaborate for innovation with foreign partners. Usually, collaboration with foreign partners is 
manly determined by the need to access the capabilities (research or/and market based) and the knowledge 
(tacit or codified) embedded in the foreign partner. When the key motivation beyond collaboration is the 
uniqueness of the knowledge of the foreign counterpart and its value for the research or the business 
strategy of the partner, than asymmetries in IP regimes will tend to play a second order effect in agents’ 
choices of collaborations.  
International collaborations in research and in inventive activity are extremely valuable for the 
transfer of tacit knowledge, routines and experience which derives from face-to-face interaction and from 
the development of common shared practices ensuing from research collaboration. International 
knowledge flows are unanimously seen as positive and necessary elements for supporting catching up and 
collaboration in research is one of the channels through which information, knowledge and to some extent 
know-how flow between partners. Usually, joint research projects involve not only the exchange of 
technical information, but also the voluntary and involuntary transmission of know-how, procedures and 
routines, issues which make those collaborations, and the associated learning processes, of extreme 
relevance for catching up countries which are in the process of strengthening their capabilities.  
Knowledge transmission from more advanced countries supports the catching up with the 
technological frontier; on the contrary, technological isolation slows down the development process and it 
is conducive to technological and economic divergence. The possibility of significant spillovers in the 
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process of international knowledge diffusion has stimulated interest in technology transfer and has raised 
inevitably issues of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. However, developing countries encounter 
difficulties to “catch up” despite (and in some cases as a consequence of) the introduction of 
homogeneous and stronger IP regimes.  
Know-how, routines and organizational capabilities, are to a great extent tacit in nature (Dosi, 1988); 
tacit knowledge is costly to transfer, and its transferability is limited by its embeddedness in individuals, 
teams and organizations.  In this context particular attention is placed on the absorptive capacity, learning 
processes and the ability of the recipient country to evaluate and effectively use the transferred knowledge 
and technology. This is why research on knowledge diffusion through inter-personal links across countries 
has recently come to the fore. International collaboration for developing countries plays a key role in 
accessing knowledge and good technology practices from abroad, and in speeding up the learning process. 
Some evidence indicates that not only international collaboration between inventors is growing but also 
that international co-operation has a positive a significant effect on domestic innovative activity. In 
addition, developing countries seem to benefit significantly when domestic inventors collaborate with 
foreign inventors in developed countries (Montobbio and Sterzi, 2011). 
TRIPS represent the biggest change in global IP regimes at the international level of the last two 
decades (Basheer, 2005; Cimoli et al. 2009). TRIPS require that WTO member nations enact and enforce 
laws on copyrights, trademarks and patents to protect intellectual property. Besides the special and 
differential treatment (SDT) provisions which confer specific rights to LDC (Least Developed Countries) 
and a series of flexibilities, the Agreement put the reform and strengthening of IP in the innovation policy 
agenda of developing and emerging economies. 
The basic rationale for the international harmonization and reinforcement of IPRs is based on three 
arguments. (1) Stronger IPRs would support technology transfer by reducing the risks to establish 
multinational corporations operations in developing countries (2) would create more incentives to sell 
goods in these markets, (3) would enhance international knowledge transfer through the development of 
markets for technologies. Arguments against the reinforcement of IPRs emphasize the possibility of 
important welfare losses due to market power pricing, the costs of closing down infringing activities, higher 
imitation costs and other risks related to patenting indigenous knowledge, enforcement problems and the 
adverse impact on the trajectory of technological learning and catching up, as well as the mismatch 
between IP policies, innovation policy and industrial policy (Cimoli and Primi, 2008; Cimoli et al., 2009). 
After the introduction of TRIPS, many scholars and policy analysts studied and assessed the impact 
of the agreement on developing countries. Various papers offered different measures of the effect of the 
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TRIPS on trade, FDIs and innovation, as well as access to drugs. Generally, this literature suggests that the 
extension of patent protections under TRIPS has nuanced effects that varied by product category, country, 
and development level1. 
However, while it is increasingly recognized that international flows of technological knowledge and 
collaboration in innovation affect importantly countries’ ability to learn and innovate, few studies address 
the impact of IPRs on international knowledge flows (for a discussion see Montobbio and Sterzi, 2013). 
This paper goes in this direction. It examines whether the changes of IP regimes across countries, 
introduced in part by the implantation of the TRIPs agreements, has supported international knowledge 
flows and international collaboration in research, as it was supposed to do in theory. This paper measures 
knowledge flows by patent citations (which track the origin and direction of codified knowledge flows) and 
co-inventorship (as a proxy of technological collaboration that gauge knowledge that is transmitted 
through interpersonal and face to face contacts). The study is based on the international patent databases 
from the European Patent Office (EPO) and it covers 13 countries: the G7 (USA, UK, Japan, Italy, 
Germany, France and Canada) and a group of emerging economies, the BRICSM (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa and Mexico). It uses a modified version of a gravity equation to model bilateral 
technological cooperation and bilateral knowledge flows to test the impact of the strengthening of IPRs.  
Section 2 explains the two indicators used to measure knowledge flows. Section 3 explores the 
available empirical evidence on the impact of TRIPS on knowledge flows. Section 4 presents the data and 
the empirical model and, finally, Section 5 discusses the results of the econometric exercise. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Measuring International Knowledge Flows: Patent Citations and Co-inventorship. 
 
The economic literature has emphasized two ways of empirically tracking knowledge flows: patent 
citations and co-inventorship. This paper, in line with the literature, estimates the impact of IPRs 
reinforcement on both types of knowledge flows, which account for different types of knowledge flows and 
interactions between agents. Patent citations measure the transfer of codified and published knowledge. 
Collaboration via co-inventorship, i.e. the number of patents co-signed by inventors living in different 
countries, is a proxy of knowledge flows generated by interpersonal and social links deriving from joint 
collaborations. Patent citations measure flows of knowledge acquired by direct reading and comprehension 
1 For example, McCalman; (2001), Kanwar and Evenson (2003); Allred and Park (2007); Qian (2007); Coriat et al (2006); Kyle 
and McGahan (2009); Delgado et al. (2011). 
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of written and available documents2, while co-inventorship can be used to track the transfer of non-codified 
knowledge (e.g. technical know-how, non-standardized production procedures etc.), which requires, at least 
periodically, face-to-face interactions.  
In this paper we use patent citations at the EPO. At the EPO, patent citations are included in the 
patent document mainly by the patent examiners in their examination report, delimit the scope of the 
property right and point to the prior art that can possibly invalidate the patent (see section 4 for the 
methodological discussion). Citations have a legal value and they are considered a particularly reliable 
indicator. If, for example, a patent signed by a Brazilian inventor cites a patent signed by a Canadian 
inventor, it can be assumed that some knowledge created in Canada is used in Brazil and, as a result, patent 
citations could track the direction of knowledge spillovers among the two inventors and the two countries.  
Knowledge flows via direct collaboration in research and face to face contacts are also important for 
innovation activities. The recognition of the relevance of personal interaction for knowledge transfer led the 
literature to measure knowledge flows through co-inventorship. Actually, knowledge and know-how 
embodied in individuals and firms circulates mainly through informal and non-codified face-to-face 
interactions and it involves different spheres, such as mobility of workers and researchers, participation to 
executive boards, effective participation in joint research programs etc.  Co-inventorship can be used as a 
proxy of direct interaction, and hence transfer of experience, routines and knowledge between co-inventors. 
Recently the literature shows that co-inventorship captures knowledge transfer between regions and 
countries (Breschi and Lissoni, 2009; Montobbio and Sterzi, 2013; Singh, 2005).  
 
3 Does Patent Strength Facilitate International Knowledge Flows?  
This paper studies the determinants of these two different types of knowledge flows using a gravity 
model. In particular we ask whether strengthening IPRs increases knowledge flows between advanced and 
emerging economies. We consider bilateral knowledge flows between G7 and BRICSM countries and assume 
that they depend upon some joint characteristics of the two countries. Following the literature it studies 
whether variables such as the economic size and innovative activities of the two countries, their 
geographical distance, the presence of common cultural roots, the level of foreign direct investment and 
bilateral trade, have an impact on knowledge flows. However, in particular it tests whether the 
reinforcement of IP protection affects knowledge flows via patent citations and via co-inventorship.  
2 There is a long tradition of studies that use patent citations to measure the value of the inventions and to map knowledge 
spillovers (e.g. Griliches, 1990, Trajtenberg 1990; Hu and Jaffe, 2003). 
 
 
4 
                                                 
Standard economic analysis suggests that stronger IPRs increase the incentives of foreign companies 
to invest in knowledge related activities and also create more incentives to innovate for domestic 
companies. Moreover the (indirect) link between IPRs and knowledge flows passes through the level and 
composition of innovative activities. The general intuition is that an exogenous change in IP legislation in 
developing countries could raise the innovativeness of domestic companies and increase their economic 
openness, via FDIs, imports and joint ventures. Generally the strength of IPRs in a developing country 
should reassure companies willing to invest and develop technologies in these countries and, indirectly, be 
conducive to increased level of domestic technological activity and technological collaborations. Moreover 
new harmonized legislation and stricter enforcement generate greater incentives to disclose technological 
knowledge. Likewise, as long as stronger IPRs stimulate trade, FDI and international joint ventures this 
may improve both the probability of direct international collaborations between inventors and the 
probability of international patent citations (Park and Lippoldt, 2008). 
However it has also been suggested that increased patent protection could harm innovative 
activities in developing countries. Part of the explanation comes from the discussion on the possible 
different strategies that multinational companies may adopt. As long as multinationals (MNCs) use patents 
to prevent the use or import of a specific technology this could harm domestic production and innovation. 
Moreover with stronger IPRs and stricter enforcement we can expect less international knowledge flows 
through imitation and adoption and the closing down infringing activities. In addition, worries have also 
been expressed that stronger IPRs generate higher cost of access to imported technologies and difficulties 
in accessing basic scientific knowledge (McCalman, 2001; Grossman and Lai, 2004). 
If stronger IPRs end up hindering the research activity of developing countries in particular (maybe 
high-tech) sectors and changing the structure and composition of their innovative activities we can expect a 
decline in the use of foreign technology in some fields and less international technological collaboration. 
Moreover strong domestic IPRs makes the local market more contendible and this may have an adverse 
effect on the domestic market structure, through mergers or acquisitions, and hence lead to a greater 
market concentration (Lesser, 1998), ultimately leading to the erosion of the local technical base. 
Take now separately into account the effects on IPRs reinforcement on the two types of knowledge 
flows we consider in this paper. With respect to patent citations, we expect a positive impact of IP 
reinforcement on patent citations as long as this increases the use of foreign technology in the domestic 
technological activity of the developing countries. IP reinforcements may increase directly the use of 
technology facilitating the construction of domestic technological capabilities not only through higher 
incentives for domestic firms to perform R&D but also through technology markets, licenses, technology 
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outsourcing and contracts, enhancing also the overall capacity to absorb foreign knowledge. In parallel, 
there is an indirect effect through for example FDI and imports. At the same time stronger patent 
protection may hinder the use of foreign technology in particular for the potentially infringing innovative 
activities. In this case we should observe a decrease in patent citations. Moreover potential limitations on 
the free use of foreign technology could lead to abandon innovative activities that eventually could have 
turned into an international patent application.  
With respect to international patent collaborations, in principle IPRs should reduce the costs of 
contracting because they generate a clearer definition of the technologies and higher certainty about the 
enforceability of contracts. As a result of a reinforcement of IPRs, we should therefore observe more trade, 
FDIs and more R&D collaborations between developed and developing and emerging countries. 
We note also that - when it comes to international technological collaboration - different channels 
of technology transfer may be used. Companies and research laboratories in order to make profits out of 
their discoveries may pursuit different innovative and collaborative strategies. These different innovative 
strategies keep into account not only the strength of IP but also a lot of other variables like market size, the 
degree of appropriability, the intensity of the competition, the type of knowledge base, power relationships 
and the degree of asymmetry in the technological capabilities. Some evidence shows that substantial 
technological collaboration takes place also when strong IPRs are not enforced (e.g. Lanjouw and 
Cockburn, 2001). In this context it is not obvious how an IP reform that generate stronger patents and 
greater enforceability in developing countries could affect international technological collaboration.  
In particular, by making the local market more appealing and by increasing litigation and 
transaction costs, stronger IPRs may decrease the incentives to undertake technological collaboration. 
Let’s assume for example that there are two countries (North and South). The North has stronger 
IPRs than the South. Assume also that there are two companies (A) and (B) with different level of 
technological capabilities. Company A is technologically more sophisticated and operates in the North and 
company B operates in the South. Company A could not want to share its tacit knowledge with a potential 
competitor: strengthening of IP makes the local market appealing and potentially profitable. Stronger IPRs 
and the creation of a market for technology may increase the incentive to license and decrease the 
incentives to undertake technological cooperation. With a weak patent legislation company A could find 
more profitable the cooperative solution (possibly with a fee or an access price), conversely with a strong 
patent legislation company A can always force company B to buy a license on its technology.  
Moreover, Company A could not want to cooperate with company B simply because it does not want 
to spend time and resources to negotiate complex licensing agreement. Company A may wish to access 
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directly the market in the South that thank to IP reform is now more profitable. In many cases to 
cooperate technologically with a local company can provide increased appropriability because the local 
company can have important complementary assets, in particular the ability to adapt products to local 
needs and distribute them. Patent reform may change the appropriabilty strategy of foreign companies that 
can use stronger IP and stricter enforceability (instead of technological cooperation) to make profits out of 
their new products and processes. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
Our patent data come from the EP‐KITES data set, which contains complete information on all 
patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). In particular we use all patent applications from 
13 countries from 1990 to 20043. We consider six developing countries: Brazil, Russian Federation, India, 
China, South Africa and Mexico (BRICSM) and 7 advanced countries (G7): Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, UK and US4. Patents are assigned to countries using the addresses of the inventors and, in 
particular, are assigned to a specific country i if there is at least one inventor resident in country i. 
The inventors’ address is a more precise information than the applicant address because there are 
much more international collaborations if we look at international teams of inventors (with respects to 
patents that are co-applied by institutions in different countries) and secondly it is at the individual level 
that the real knowledge exchange takes place5. 
We observe an international technological collaboration between country A (emerging) and country B 
(advanced) when a patent is co-signed by at least one inventor resident in country A and at least one 
inventor resident in country B6. A possible noise in the data can be generated by individual inventors that 
work abroad but keep on declaring the address of the home country (e.g. Montobbio and Sterzi, 2013 for a 
discussion). Although this is always a case of international knowledge flows7, we control for this by 
excluding those patents where the number of domestic inventors is less than 20% of the total number of 
inventors in the team. For example if we observe a patent with 6 US inventors and one Brazilian inventor 
3 In case of Russian Federation the panel goes from 1995 to 2004 due to missing information on IPR index till 1995 (Park, 
2008).  
4 The sample for the BRICSM countries is composed by 15035 patent applications, which have been signed by 30090 inventors. 
5 Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) elaborates on this point. 
6 If a patents is signed by three inventors from three different countries in our sample, we consider all three bilateral relations. 
7 The individual inventor abroad could be seen as a form of knowledge brokerage between the technological network in the 
advanced and emerging country. 
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we could argue that this is not an international collaboration between Brazil and the US but rather that 
there is a Brazilian inventor working in a US institution.  
The second dependent variable is the number of bilateral patent citations. We consider the yearly 
number of bilateral backward citations in patents signed by at least one inventor resident in the BRICSM to 
one of the G7 country. Moreover, since the EPO indicates the origin of each patent citation8, we can verify 
whether the citation was added by the applicant/inventor or by the examiner. We consider two measures 
of patent citations: (1) the number of citations added by both the patent applicant/inventor and the 
examiner, and (2) the number of citations added only by the patent applicant/inventor. The latter can be 
considered to be closer to the idea of knowledge flows to the extent that it consider only prior knowledge 
directly introduced by the applicant/inventor9. Differently from the USPTO, where the "duty of candor" 
rule imposes the disclosure of all prior art, at the EPO the majority of citations are introduced during the 
search by the patent examiner. For Brazilian and Indian patents in the sample the citations added by the 
applicant/inventor are around the half of those added by the examiner; one third for Chinese, Mexican, 
Russian and South African patents.  
 
 
4.1 International knowledge flows in the BRICSM. A descriptive analysis  
For each emerging country, Table 1 shows in each emerging country the total number of patents 
per year, the number of patents with at least a foreign inventor who resides in one of the G7 countries, and 
among the collaborative patents those with at least 20% of inventors residing in the emerging country. It 
shows that BRICSM countries have a substantial share of international patents which are co-invented with 
the G7 countries, especially if compared to G7 case.  
While on average for the BRICSM the share of international collaborations range between 15% and 
60% (higher for Mexico and smaller for South Africa) for the G7 countries the same share ranges between 
0.2% and 4% (higher for Canada and smaller for Japan) 10. It is also important that this share is increasing 
in all the 7 advanced countries while no clear patterns emerge from the BRICSM. The share of 
international collaborative patents seems to decline in China and India indicating a growing importance of 
8 There are eight different origin types: citations introduced during search, citations introduced by the applicant, citations 
introduced during examination, citations introduced during opposition, citations introduced according to Art 115 EPC, citations 
from the International Search Report, citations from the Supplementary Search Report, citations introduced during the Chapter 
2 phase of the PCT. Recent literature suggests that examiners’ citations display different properties (for EPO data see Criscuolo 
and Verspagen, 2008). 
9 We also acknowledge that it is however possible that the patent applicant/inventor cites prior art by searching after completing 
the invention and only during the application: in this case we do not observe a knowledge flow (Thompson, 2006). 
10 Detailed statistics for G7 countries are available upon request by the authors. 
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domestic technological activity in these two countries. At the same time it displays a positive trend in 
Brazil, Mexico and Russia with a peak in the mid-nineties and then either the trend remains flat or declines. 
Table 2 shows the number of patents with only national inventors, with at least an inventor from other 
BRICSM countries, the US, the EU (four countries) and Japan. If we consider two sub-periods, before and 
after 1996, it shows that the share of patents that have at least one inventor from the US tends to decrease 
for China, India and Mexico. The share of collaborative patents with the EU4 tends to decrease for all 
countries with the exception of Mexico and Russia.  
For what concerns the EPO backward citations, Table 3 shows that only a minority of them remain 
within the national borders, indicating still a lack of in-house technological capabilities. This is especially 
true for Mexico and China where only 2.7% and 3.1% are citations to domestic patents in 2004. 
Interestingly, data do not show any significant increase of domestic citations over the years considered.  
Table 3 displays the number of backward citations by destination country (and shares) before and after 
1996. No major structural change occurs in the period observed. There is a slight increase in citations that 
stay within the same country, but the share of these citations remain very low with the exception of South 
Africa in recent years. Table 3 also shows that geographical distance may play a role since China, India and 
Russian Federation cite more frequently Japanese patents than Latin American countries ones. 
Interestingly, Mexico is closer to the United States, while Brazil more to the Europe: in the period 97-2003 
40% of the citations of Mexican patents go to the US and 32% go to EU4 patents; while for Brazil we have 
a reversed picture with 39% of citations to the EU4 and 30% of their citations to US patents. 
 
4.2 The Econometric model 
We estimate the impact of IPRs reinforcement on the international technological collaborations 
and on patent citations using a gravity model (Picci, 2010; Montobbio and Sterzi, 2013). Gravity models 
have been widely used in explaining trade flows. Disdier and Head (2008) show that the negative impact of 
distance on trade flows began to rise after the 1950s and remains high. Taking into account in their meta-
analysis of approximately 1400 distance effects estimated in 103 different econometric papers, they show 
that the mean bilateral trade flow elasticity to distance is equal to 0.9 and challenge significantly the idea 
that with globalization distance is becoming less relevant.  
Peri (2005) analyses knowledge flows across region in a gravity framework using patent citations. 
He finds that knowledge flows go much farther than trade flow even if knowledge flows remain highly 
localized. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) study technological internationalization of 
the OECD countries and show that small and low tech countries are more open. They also find that 
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technological collaboration depends upon technological proximity and the presence of both a common 
language and a common border. Finally, Picci (2010) studies international collaboration using co-inventors 
and co-applicants of a set of patent applications at the European national patent offices and at the EPO 
and investigates the increased level of technological collaborations of the European countries. He finds 
that distance, common language and common borders explain a substantial part of the variation in bilateral 
collaborations. 
This paper estimates the impact of IPRs reinforcement on different types of knowledge flows 
following a standard empirical implementation (e.g. Disdier and Head, 2008) represented in the following 
equation: 
 
E[xijt]= A
α
itA
β
jtD
θ
ijexp(λORIGij+ δTijt) IMPijt
ν1 FDIit
ν2IPRγite
τt       (1) 
 
xijt is equal to (1) the number of collaborations, where the number of domestic inventor is at least 
20% of the total number of inventors, between developing country i and developed country j at time t or, 
alternatively, (2) the yearly number of bilateral backward citations in patents signed by at least an inventor 
resident in developing country i and citing a developed country j at time t.  
The main variable under scrutiny is the general strength of the domestic intellectual system (IPRit). 
This variable is the Ginarte and Park index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Park and Wagh, 2002; Park, 2008). 
This index11 ranges from zero to five and its value is the un-weighted sum of five sub-indexes that range 
from 0 to 1: (1) extent of coverage (subject matter and types of invention), (2) membership in international 
treaties, (3) duration of protection, (4) absence of restrictions on rights (e.g. degree of exclusivity), and, 
finally, (5) statutory enforcement provisions (e.g. preliminary injunctions). The IPR index is a broader 
variable and it is only in part affected by the adoption of the TRIPs agreements. 
Secondly, in order to capture the TRIPs effect in the emerging countries we rely upon a treatment 
variable TRIPSt which is equal to one if t≥ 1996 and zero elsewhere., and we test whether it has a positive 
impact on the bilateral technological collaborations and backward citations between country i and country 
j. This treatment variable however might catch only partially the effects of the TRIPs because the real 
implementation level is different across countries.  
11 Data are available for an average of 1960–90, for 1995, 2000, and 2005. The IPR observation for the year 1990 has been used 
till 1995, when new information is available. The IPR observation for the year 1995 has been used for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
and 1999. The IPR observation for the year 2000 has been used for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. Finally, the IPR observation of 
the year 2005 has been used for the year 2004. 
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Aαit and A
β
jt measure specific characteristics of country i and j. They are the constant price gdp 
(GDPit and GDPit respectively for emerging and advanced country) and PATENTSit and PATENTSit are 
the total number of patent applications respectively of country i and country j, at time t. Dij is the 
geographical distance (DISTANCEij)between them, where θ is the “distance effect” and represents the 
(negative) elasticity of bilateral patent citations or technological collaborations with respect to geographical 
distance. Moreover we control for some further specific characteristics of developing countries i. We also 
expect technological collaborations to be related to the inflow of foreign direct investments (FDIit). Finally 
we augment the gravity model by including bilateral imports (IMPijt) which represents the value of country i 
import from country j. 
TPijt represents the technological proximity between emerging and advanced countries. It is 
measured by the uncentered correlation of the two countries’ distribution vectors of patents across 30 
technological classes (OST, 2004) at time t (Pi and Pj ), as follows: TPij = PiP’j/[(PiP’i)(PjPj)]1/2. This indicator 
typically ranges between 0 and 1 for all other pairs of countries. It is equal to one for the pairs of countries 
with identical distribution of technological activities; it is equal to zero if the distributions are orthogonal 
(Jaffe, 1988). Finally a dummy indicating a common legal origin (ORIGij) which is equal to one if i and j 
have a common legal origin (La Porta et al., 1998). Table 4 shows a description of the datasets used and their 
sources. 
Our dependent variables are non-negative integers and challenge the use of linear regression 
models such as OLS12. Moreover, since their distribution is highly skewed and exhibits overdisperion, we 
rely upon Negative Binomial (NB) models13 (Hausman et al., 1984) with clustered robust standard errors to 
control for error correlation in the panel (Cameron and Golotvina, 2005), since observations in pairs of 
countries are likely to be dependent across years14. All the regressions contain a full set of time dummies (tt) 
to control for time varying un-observables that are common across countries. Moreover, to control for 
fixed effects we include either unobserved individual time constant effect specific to country i and country 
j (NB models), or time constant effect specific to each pair. Finally, we control for all the unobservable 
12 A possible problem may arise from the endogeneity of the some variables (e.g. imports, FDIs, IPRs). Reverse causality may 
result from self-selection. The countries with companies more willing to cooperate and use IPRs may accelerate trade, FDIs 
relations and the adoption of stricter IP rules. It could be that firms in high-tech or patent-intensive industries on the basis of 
collaborative strategies increases trade, FDIs and lobby for protection leading to reverse causality or, conversely, that 
governments decide to protect the best innovative companies, and so it is not clear which way the bias, if any, would go. 
However it is generally difficult to find valid instruments, and in a fixed effects model at country level it is unclear whether there 
is in fact a serious endogeneity issue. 
13 According to the LR test, for both collaborations and citations models, we prefer the Negative Binomial rather than Poisson. 
14 An alternative to Negative Binomial model is the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator as suggested by 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), with the classical Huber and White sandwich estimator of variance (Huber, 1967, White, 
1980). Moreover PPML estimator does not require that data be distributed as a Poisson and are consistent in the presence of 
fixed effects and when the frequency of zeros is quite important (Ben Shepherd, 2013). 
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factors which characterize each country-pairs and may have an impact on the propensity to collaborate and 
cite by using NB Fixed Effects models. 
5. Results 
Tables 5 and 6 present the estimates of the gravity models. In column (1)-(3) in both tables we 
show simple NB regressions with individual time constant effects specific to emerging and advanced 
country; in column (4) and (5) we show fixed effects NB models which include fixed effects relative to 
each specific pair of countries. Moreover all models contain a full set of time dummies which capture any 
time shock that is common to all bilateral relations.  
First we estimate the effect of our selected determinants on knowledge flows measured by patterns 
of co-inventorship (Table 5). Secondly we ask how the same determinants affect the transfer of knowledge 
captured by patent citations (Table 6). A group of results are common in the two sets of regressions. The 
estimates show that the gravity model is asymmetric because the masses measured by patenting activity and 
GDP have different effect according to emerging and advanced country. In particular patenting activity has 
a positive and significant effect only in the case of patent applications by emerging countries (ln 
PATENTSit). Moreover, the size of the economy is positively correlated to the number of patent 
collaborations and patent citations only in case of advanced countries (ln GDPij), indicating that emerging 
countries tend to interact more with the largest economies. 
Secondly, differently from to the international trade theory where bilateral trade and FDIs decrease 
with geographical distance (Disdier, Head; 2008), we find that geographical distance (DISTANCEij) is 
negative but slightly significant only for patent citations. It can be noted that contrary to the usual 
assumption we find that examiner citations are more localized than inventor citations (see Criscuolo and 
Verspagen, 2008; Bacchiocchi and Montobbio, 2010). Rather than geographical distance, other forms of 
distances, such as technological and cultural distances, play a more important role, especially for patent 
collaborations. In fact other forms of distances - such as having a common legal origin (ORIGij) and 
similarity in the technological distribution of the inventive activity (TPijt) - have still a significant effect. 
In particular, the difference in the logs of expected patent collaborations is expected to be 0.51 
units higher for countries sharing a common legal origin, while holding the other variables constant in the 
model. The effect is positive but not significant for patent citations.  Technological proximity is positive 
and significant both for technological collaborations and patent citations, bilateral imports and FDIs do 
not display any significant correlation with patent collaborations. A positive and significant correlation for 
trade is found only in the case of patent citations (column 2-4, Table 7). 
 
 
12 
Our results do not highlight any positive effect of strengthening IPRs on technological 
collaborations neither in NB models nor in fixed effects NB models. However, as suggested in Montobbio 
and Sterzi (2013), this may depend on the fact that IPRs may have different effects on the technological 
collaborations to the extent that these originate from multinationals’ subsidiaries, domestic firms, or single 
inventors. 
For BRICSM countries, variations in the IPR variable can be directly related to the compliance to 
the TRIPS agreements in 1996. To control for this possibility we introduce also the variable TRIPSt (a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the year 1996-2004 and zero otherwise) in order to control for that 
portion of variation that can be attributed to this agreement. Table 6 shows that the estimated coefficient 
of the TRIPS agreement on international technological collaborations is negative but still not significantly 
different from zero (column (3)).  Altogether these results do not provide any signal of a positive effect of 
IPRs reinforcement on knowledge flows captured by international patenting collaborations.  
Table 6 shows that in the case of patent citations, strengthening IPRs, similarly to the international 
collaborations case, has a non-significant impact on the international knowledge flows (Columns 1-4). 
However we observe different results when we consider only citations which are added from the applicants 
(or inventors) during the application procedure (Columns 5-8). The idea is that a citation is able to track 
the direction of knowledge to the extent that it has been added, and so it is known, by the patent 
applicant/inventor. This is particularly important for EPO patents, where the majority of patent citations 
are added by the examiners rather that the applicants (or inventors). In this case, stronger IPRs turn out to 
be positively correlated with the number of backward citations. This result is robust to the control of the 
dummy variable TRIPS. Results in Columns 7 and 8 show that the implementation of the TRIPS 
agreements does not have an additional positive impact on the patent citations15.  
 
6. Conclusion 
As innovation goes global, there is a rising demand for global knowledge governance. This issue is at 
the center of the political debate in advanced, as well as in emerging and developing economies. However, 
which mix of policies better supports the generation and diffusion of knowledge in global economies on a 
fair basis is still an open debate. Innovation is increasingly the result of the combination of knowledge, 
know-how, competences and techniques whose generation and diffusion occur usually involving 
international counterparts. In developing countries access to foreign technologies, collaboration with 
15 However, by consider 1 year lag for independent variables, the effect of the TRIPS variable and its interaction with IPR turn 
out to be negative and significant (p<0.01) 
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foreign counterparts, both in the domestic country and abroad is a hot political issue. Scientific research 
increasingly involves international counterparts and mobility of researchers is on the rise. Collaborative 
links with foreign laboratories rely more on relational and capability proximity than on geographical 
distance. Also, multinationals are increasingly delocalizing R&D activities in host countries, spurring a 
debate on which are the conditions under which the local community of researchers and firms can learn by 
tapping into foreign collaborative networks. Governments, for example in Brazil, in Mexico as well as in 
India, set up different types of incentives for their researchers to build close interpersonal collaboration 
with foreign researchers, and encourage local firms to collaborate with foreign subsidiaries to access 
foreign knowledge, or support delocalization of firms to learn from foreign practices in foreign markets.  
In this context our paper contributes in two ways. First of all we compare the economic and 
institutional determinants of two types of knowledge flows. The ones that flow disembodied and codified 
and the ones that, since technical knowledge is in many aspect specific and tacit, are transmitted through 
face to face contacts. We show that geographical distance (e.g. communications and transport costs) does 
not have a strong direct effect on knowledge flows. Still it could have an indirect effect in particular 
through trade. Conversely technological proximity favors the transfer of knowledge. In addition knowledge 
flows are stronger when developing countries have accumulated a larger stock of patents and when they 
interact with the largest advanced economies. Our results show also that when knowledge is tacit, the 
economic and institutional determinants of knowledge flows have a stronger impact. The impact of sharing 
a common legal origin is positive and significant in the case of international technological collaborations.  
Secondly we discuss the impact on knowledge diffusion of IP reinforcement in emerging countries. 
Our evidence suggests that there is not a strong and positive effect on knowledge flows generated by the 
reinforcement of IPRs in emerging economies and in particular by the TRIPs agreements. In particular our 
estimates show that IPRs reinforcement has not a positive effect on knowledge flows between the 
BRICSM countries and the G7 countries when international collaborations and the total number of patent 
citations are considered. We find however a positive effect of IPRs when only applicants’ citations are 
considered. An interesting challenge for further work is to explore whether this relation depends upon new 
IPRs based knowledge markets or formal economic relationship via trade or FDIs. 
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Table 1. Patents, collaborative patents and real collaborative patents (by inventors), BRICSM 
countries, EPO patents 
  Brazil China India 
year Totala 
Collaborati
veb 
Real 
Collaborat
ivec 
% 
(b/
a) 
Tot
ala 
Collaborati
veb 
Real 
Collaborat
ivec 
% 
(b/
a) 
Tot
ala 
Collaborati
veb 
Real 
Collaborat
ivec 
% 
(b/
a) 
1990 51 10 9 20% 36 9 7 25% 34 17 13 50% 
1991 35 9 8 26% 38 13 10 34% 22 10 9 45% 
1992 58 16 12 28% 45 18 10 40% 31 13 13 42% 
1993 60 14 11 23% 45 26 15 58% 44 26 15 59% 
1994 45 12 10 27% 54 18 12 33% 34 21 12 62% 
1995 77 34 26 44% 74 31 23 42% 45 20 13 44% 
1996 69 24 17 35% 93 36 33 39% 74 32 22 43% 
1997 109 26 19 24% 133 55 40 41% 83 25 21 30% 
1998 115 66 23 57% 153 49 49 32% 147 53 39 36% 
1999 142 31 15 22% 250 67 49 27% 183 72 62 39% 
2000 137 36 25 26% 406 136 93 33% 224 69 45 31% 
2001 171 51 38 30% 509 128 98 25% 321 77 60 24% 
2002 153 33 30 22% 692 166 117 24% 499 109 95 22% 
2003 201 46 36 23% 1136 216 174 19% 597 178 141 30% 
2004 212 69 55 33% 1256 243 169 19% 591 186 142 31% 
TOT
AL 1635 477 334 29% 4920 1211 890 25% 2929 908 702 31% 
  Mexico Russia South Africa 
year Totala 
Collaborati
veb 
Real 
Collaborat
ivec 
% 
(b/
a) 
Tot
ala 
Collaborati
veb 
Real 
Collaborat
ivec 
% 
(b/
a) 
Tot
ala 
Collaborati
veb 
Real 
Collaborat
ivec 
% 
(b/
a) 
1990 18 5 5 28% 72 4 4 6% 63 8 8 13% 
1991 14 2 2 14% 90 13 13 14% 71 8 7 11% 
1992 16 7 6 44% 143 29 29 20% 126 12 11 10% 
1993 25 16 13 64% 148 39 39 26% 108 18 18 17% 
1994 22 14 12 64% 173 56 52 32% 84 9 8 11% 
1995 35 17 15 49% 169 53 49 31% 92 20 17 22% 
1996 30 11 8 37% 216 70 61 32% 94 15 12 16% 
1997 58 22 15 38% 213 74 71 35% 152 19 15 13% 
1998 47 24 21 51% 255 87 80 34% 163 26 16 16% 
1999 56 26 23 46% 279 105 91 38% 154 24 15 16% 
2000 42 22 16 52% 287 100 88 35% 165 37 36 22% 
2001 59 27 25 46% 301 101 92 34% 132 22 20 17% 
2002 67 31 24 46% 238 87 75 37% 144 18 13 13% 
2003 86 34 28 40% 277 101 90 36% 151 17 13 11% 
2004 70 34 23 49% 280 93 82 33% 149 27 23 18% 
TOT
AL 645 292 236 45% 3141 1012 916 32% 1848 280 232 15% 
a: number of patents by inventor at the EPO; b: number of patents with at least on inventor residing in one of the 
selected advanced countries; c: number of patents with at least on inventor residing in one of the selected advanced 
countries where the domestic inventors are at least the 20%. 
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Table 2. Geographical distribution of EPO patents by address of inventors before and after Trips. Number of patents and shares by region.  
  Only national co-inventors a Other BRICSM 
b US c EU4 d Japan d 
  90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 
Brazil  394 73,50% 1025 73,50% 3 0,60% 4 0,30% 43 8,00% 126 9,00% 70 13,10% 149 10,70% 2 0,40% 8 0,60% 
China  382 67,60% 3257 74,50% 4 0,70% 5 0,10% 74 13,10% 473 10,80% 43 7,60% 229 5,20% 26 4,60% 65 1,50% 
India  283 64,50% 2038 73,80% 2 0,50% 3 0,10% 87 19,80% 390 14,10% 42 9,60% 161 5,80% 6 1,40% 15 0,50% 
Mexico  161 63,90% 411 66,10% 1 0,40% 3 0,50% 52 20,60% 113 18,20% 17 6,70% 61 9,80% 2 0,80% 3 0,50% 
Russia  1006 71,80% 1846 66,80% 2 0,10% 5 0,20% 103 7,30% 300 10,90% 136 9,70% 306 11,10% 15 1,10% 25 0,90% 
S. Africa  642 84,50% 1055 83,10% 4 0,50% 2 0,20% 24 3,20% 57 4,50% 64 8,40% 94 7,40% 1 0,10% 1 0,10% 
a: number of patents with only national inventors; b: number of patents with at least an inventor from another BRICSM country; c: number of patents 
with at least one US inventor; d: number of patents with at least one inventor from the EU4 countries; e: number of patents with at least a Japanese 
inventor. Percentages have been rounded and my not total to 100%. 
 
 
Table 3. Number of backward citations to EPO patents by destination country (and shares) before and after Trips 
  National citations a Other BRICSM b US c EU4 d Japan e  
  90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 90-96 97-04 
Brazil  20 2,7% 92 4,3% 3 0,4% 23 1,0% 323 44,1% 778 36,8% 293 40,0% 947 44,7% 79 10,8% 252 11,90% 
China  32 4,0% 376 4,7% 4 0,5% 47 0,6% 301 37,8% 3321 41,8% 261 32,7% 2389 30,1% 191 24,0% 1593 20,1% 
India  23 3,9% 246 5,8% 5 0,8% 39 0,9% 262 44,1% 1869 44,2% 202 34,0% 1328 31,4% 92 15,5% 668 15,8% 
Mexico  14 4,6% 39 4,3% 3 1,0% 6 0,7% 144 46,9% 389 42,9% 122 39,7% 345 38,0% 23 7,5% 109 12,0% 
Russia  117 6,7% 391 10,0% 4 0,2% 23 0,6% 623 35,6% 1635 41,9% 612 35,00% 1193 30,6% 370 21,1% 588 15,1% 
S. Africa  155 12,6% 271 16,6% 7 0,6% 10 0,6% 402 32,7% 612 37,5% 493 40,1% 550 33,7% 137 11,2% 157 9,6% 
a: number of citations from a selected BRICSM country to patents of the same BRICSM country; b: number of citations from a selected BRICSM 
country to another BRICSM country; c: to US; d: to EU4 countries; e: to Japan. Percentages have been rounded and my not total to 100%. 
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Table 4 . Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition  Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Collaborative patents 
Number of EPO patents with at least an inventor 
from country i (emerging) and country j 
(advanced)where the weight of domestic inventors 
is at least 20% of the. 
 
Ep-Kites (Patstat) 
Database 
595 5.33 11.68 0 127 
Citations 
Number of EPO citations made by patents of 
country i to patents of country j in year t. (added by 
the Examiners and Applicant/Inventors) 
Ep-Kites (Patstat) 
Database 
595 44.81 78.04 0 788 
Citations only from 
Applicants 
Number of EPO citations made by patents of 
country i to patents of country j in year t. (added 
only by the Applicant/Inventors 
Ep-Kites (Patstat) 
Database 
595 8.21 18.50 0 164 
ln PATENTSit Number of EPO patent applications in year t with 
at least an inventor residing in country i and j 
respectively (in logarithm). 
 595 4.66 .95 2.70 7.13 
ln PATENTSjt 
Ep-Kites (Patstat) 
Database 595 8.88 1.02 6.41 10.41 
ln GDPit Millions of constant US dollars, (year 2000 prices) 
(in logarithm). 
 595 12.89 .68 11.58 14.35 
ln GDPjt World Bank 595 28.25 .84 26.99 29.99 
ln IMPijt 
Bilateral imports, millions of US dollars, current 
prices (in logarithm). 
Stan Bilateral Trade 
Database 595 7.62 1.19 1.79 11.62 
ln FDIit 
Inward - millions of constant US dollars, (year 
2000 prices) (in logarithm). 
 
Unctad 595 8.31 2.01 0 11.01 
ln DISTANCEij 
Km, simple distance which uses latitudes and 
longitudes of the most important 
cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) (in 
logarithm). 
 
 
 
CEPII dataset 595 8.94 .50 7.63 9.82 
ORIGij 
Dummy which equals to one if the two countries 
have a common legal origin 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 595 .25 .43 0 1 
TPijt Indicator of pairwise "technological proximity" 
Own elaboration 
from Ep-Kites 
(Patstat) Database 595 .68 .12 .26 .94 
ln IPRit 
Ginarte and Park Index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; 
Park 2008) (in logarithm). 
 
Park, W. (2008) 595 .83 .48 .02 1.44 
TRIPSt 
Dummy equals to one if t≥ 1996 and zero 
elsewhere. 
 
595 .63 .48 0 1 
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Table 5. The impact of IPRs on Collaborative Patents 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  NBREG NBREG FE NBREG FE NBREG FE 
          
ln PATENTSit 0.70*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 
  (0.13) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) 
ln PATENTSjt 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.32 
  (0.39) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) 
ln GDPit -0.33 -0.27 -0.27 -0.24 
  (0.41) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) 
ln GDPjt 1.23 1.44*** 1.45** 1.46** 
  (0.82) (0.54) (0.57) (0.57) 
TPijt 1.51*** 0.91*** 0.91** 0.91*** 
  (0.41) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
ln IMPijt 0.18* 0.0056 0.0060 -0.0015 
  (0.11) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) 
ln FDIit -0.069 -0.041 -0.040 -0.046 
  (0.055) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) 
ln DISTANCEij -0.19       
  (0.19)       
ORIGij 0.51***       
  (0.18)       
ln IPRit -0.013 0.0088 0.011 -0.11 
  (0.18) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) 
TRIPSt     -0.016 -0.12 
      (0.43) (0.44) 
ln IPRit*TRIPSt       0.15 
        (0.17) 
Constant -35.6* -40.9*** -41.1*** -41.9*** 
  (19.6) (13.7) (15.5) (15.6) 
          
Observations 595 595 595 595 
Country i dummy Yes No No No 
Country j dummy Yes No No No 
Standard errors in parentheses; in models (I) standard errors are clustered at pair 
level.  All models include year dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
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Table 6. The impact of Trips on Patent Backward Citations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  NBREG  
NBREG 
FE 
NBREG 
FE 
NBREG 
FE NBREG 
NBREG 
FE 
NBREG 
FE 
NBREG 
FE 
  Citations from Applicants and Examiners Citations only from Applicants  
                  
ln PATENTSit 1.09*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.19*** 1.14*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 
  (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.20) (0.098) (0.10) (0.10) 
ln PATENTSjt 0.23 -0.17 -0.14 -0.13 1.23 -0.26 -0.31 -0.30 
  (0.27) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.88) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
ln GDPit -0.27 -0.32** -0.29** -0.34** 1.55 -0.45* -0.43* -0.44* 
  (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (1.14) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
ln GDPjt 0.57** 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.41 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.63*** 
  (0.26) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (1.40) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
TPijt 0.82*** 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.75*** 0.41 2.12*** 2.03*** 2.03*** 
  (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.82) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
ln IMPijt 0.00014 0.12** 0.13** 0.13** 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.16 
  (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.086) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
ln FDIit -0.032 -0.033** -0.022 -0.0078 0.097 0.10 0.048 0.054 
  (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.100) (0.069) (0.077) (0.077) 
ln DISTANCEij -0.16*       -0.052       
  (0.084)       (0.14)       
ORIGij 0.088       -0.38***       
  (0.061)       (0.095)       
ln IPRit -0.17 -0.018 0.0076 0.16 0.38 0.52*** 0.49** 0.69** 
  (0.11) (0.081) (0.085) (0.11) (0.37) (0.20) (0.20) (0.35) 
TRIPSt     -0.18 -0.041     14.0 14.2 
      (0.20) (0.21)     (564) (579) 
ln IPRit*TRIPSt       -0.21**       -0.24 
        (0.094)       (0.34) 
Constant -16.3*** -15.1*** -15.8*** -14.9*** -50.2 -20.4*** -33.5 -33.5 
  (5.99) (4.07) (4.14) (4.17) (31.4) (5.90) (564) (579) 
ln alpha -2.63***       -0.79***       
  (0.18)       (0.17)       
                  
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 
Country i 
dummy Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Country j 
dummy Yes No No No Yes No No No 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; in models (1) and (5) standard errors are clustered at pair level.  All models include year 
dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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